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The author deals with some core understandings and misunderstandings 
and a few myths in regard to this very popular current tool of economic 
policies in both developing and developed countries.
I worked for many years as a regular staff member of the World Bank in Washington and most recently as a consultant. I discovered very early in the seventies, 
even before the Bank itself, the link between law and 
justice and economic development and how crucial it is for 
peace and economic growth in developing countries to 
adhere strictly and passionately to a society ruled by law 
and not by the arbitrary exercise of personal and political 
power. In 1803, the great Chief Justice of the US Supreme 
Court, John Marshall, said it best, albeit in a different 
context, in the landmark constitutional law case Marbury v 
Madison (1 Cranch 137 (1803)) when he declared that 
"The Government of the United States has been emphatically 
termed a government of laws and not oj men." The United 
States is the richest and most powerful country in the 
world today.
Privatization is the process of transferring activities r o
carried out by the state and state agencies and other state 
owned enterprises to be performed by private 
undertakings (natural and juristic)   privately owned 
companies, partnerships and associations and individuals. 
There are numerous publications that cover the technical 
aspects of privatization. The publications of the World 
Bank are particularly useful in the analyses of experiences 
in the developing countries, the methods employed to 
divest state assets and the obstacles and pitfalls in the 
privatization of public enterprises. This paper deals with 
some core understandings and misunderstandings and ao o
few myths in regard to this very popular current tool of 
economic policies in both developing and developed 
countries. As Paul Harvev of National Public Radio in the 
United States would say "You have just heard the news. Here 
now is the rest of the story.
Privatization in simple practical terms means that some 
in government will be passing on their work and
responsibilities to others in the private sector. They may 
even be encouraged or tempted to join their friends and 
counterparts in the private sector and that can be a very 
good thing. More importantly, privatization invariably 
involves the sale or lease or other disposition of public or 
state owned assets including land to the private sector. 
Unfortunately, in the developing countries, it is more likely 
that the government will be passing on some of its work 
and responsibilities and divesting state owned assets not to 
the local private sector but to some foreign business 
undertaking in a developed country. Those undertakings 
will be for the most part operating in their own enclave 
economies within the developing countries under special 
foreign investment protection laws and bi-lateral 
investment treaties.
Ironically, too, in many cases of privatization, the 
government may actually be passing on its work and 
divesting public assets to a public sector company or state 
authority in a foreign state such as China, Singapore, 
France and Italy. It can all be very confusing!. There are 
real risks in divesting a state enterprise engaged in strategic 
sectors such as transport, energy, communications and 
health to a public sector company of another state which 
can conceivably use it as a weapon, intelligence apparatus 
or diplomatic arm.
State assets are vast and, if properly managed, their value 
to the people in terms of social and economic benefits 
can be great. States, developed and developing alike, own 
land, ports, air ports, railways, electric power plants and 
distribution systems, bus companies and gas stations, oil 
wells and refineries, mines, banks and insurance 
companies. States hold stock in public and private 
companies and are engaged in research and development. 
Some states are involved directly or indirectly in food 
processing, manufacturing of industrial and consumer
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products, pharmaceuticals and a variety of other businesses 
and other states are engaged even in the export and import 
of a variety of commodities. In principle, however, the 
scope of the public sector covers areas of essential public 
services and national defense and activities that concern 
public interests or have natural monopoly or near- 
monopoly characteristics. At least, that is the argument 
governments are prone to advance to maintain ownership 
and control of the market.
The value of state assets in monetary terms is enormous 
and the point to remember is that state assets and earnings 
belong to the people and not to the government du jour and 
its political supporters. The State in international law can 
be said to be synonymous with a stable population which it 
represents through the instrument of Government which 
consists of, besides the Executive, the Legislative and 
Judicial branches. No People, no State and no 
Government. Therefore, in the disposition and disposal of 
state assets to the private sector there is a duty on the part 
of the government to ensure that (i) it has the authority to 
do so under the constitution and the law and (ii) the 
benefits of such actions accrue to the people generally and 
not to a privileged few within government and without.
LAW AND PRIVATIZATION
Although privatization of state assets is primarily a 
political matter, in many developing countries, it has legal 
and constitutional implications that are either not 
understood clearly or are simply ignored by wrell meaning 
politicians. They are pressured and often seduced by 
foreign economic and commercial interests some of them 
equally well meaning with promises of enriching their 
economies rapidly in exchange for various concessions to 
exploit mineral and other key economic resources. They 
are persuaded by bi-lateral aid agencies and the 
development banks and the IMF to let the private sector 
take over state owned enterprises and some of the public 
services to improve economic performance even if it 
meant bending the law. East Timor is a recent example that 
might bring tears to any one sensitive to the plight of 
unsophisticated developing countries lacking technology 
and finance but rich in natural resources.
East Timor became independent on Sunday May 19 but, 
according to the Herald Tribune of May 17, 2002, already 
"battle lines have been drawn for the oil riches'" off its coast. 
What I cannot comprehend is how oil and gas concessions 
were signed by the leadership-elect of that unfortunate 
country even before it became an independent state, all 
under the auspices of the United Nations. It is shocking 
that the key natural resources that belong to the people of 
one of the poorest and least developed parts of the world 
could have been so easily disposed of even before a \iable 
independent government was in place, had time to set its 
own vision and goals, develop the key elements of country 
economic policy and sector development plans, secure the
approval of Parliament and prepare for the negotiation of 
these critical oil and gas deals. Even President Bush had too
go to the Congress for its approval for the leasing of the 
lands in Northern Alaska for the exploration and drilling 
for oil.
According to the Herald Tribune report, the East Timor 
oil and natural gas reserves are estimated to be worth USo
$ 40 billion over 17 years and the East Timor stands to 
gain only US $ 3.2 billion, about 8 per cent. Why did the 
World Bank and IMF with all their expertise keep 
themselves at arm's distance from the transactions that led 
to the disposal of East Timor people's control of their 
country's oil and gas deposits? Did the World Bank 
scrutinize the accuracy of the exploration and production 
costs and the equity7 in the share of the revenues?
Are the oil and pas concessions enforceable in law ando
under the East Timor constitution and what are the 
consequences if subsequent governments disagree with the 
present rulers? Why should the capacity to enter into valid 
contractual relations in international law be less strict than 
in domestic or municipal law? Has the stage been set in 
East Timor for future bloody struggles among political 
parties and the military over a share of the bounty from the 
oil and gas as it happened in Angola and Congo over oil and 
mineral riches and in Sierra Eeone over diamonds?.
The very government that sent advisers to East Timor to 
help the provisional leadership and made these "deals" is 
gearing to battle with the East Timor over its maritime 
boundary because of the oil and pas fields. Australia has
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already declared its decision to exclude compulsory 
resolution of the border dispute by the International Court 
of Justice. Why? Did the leadership-elect of East Timor 
take the decisions to enter into those deals independently? 
Were the oil and gas concessions executed under economic 
duress or economic black mail? Are they legally 
enforceable in the absence of statutory backing from East 
Timor's legislative body?
I have absolutely nothing against Australia or other 
developed country because ours is a competitive world 
but I only wish that the developing countries pursued 
their economic and strategic interests as selfishly and 
tenaciously as the developed countries and used their 
own independent judgment in the disposal of their 
mineral and other key economic resources and in the 
entry into contractual relations that can impact on the 
countries for generations to come. Worse still,o '
developing countries seem to acquiesce, in foreign 
investment laws, bilateral investment agreements and 
grants of long term concessions, to conduct ando o '
practices damaging to their long term economic and
1 O O O
strategic interests and which conduct and practices 
become over time rules of international law binding 
developing countries to ill conceived international trade 
and economic relations.
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A major outrageous project proposal is in the offing in 
Nicaragua. At a recent presentation to World Bank staff by 
a group of promoters, support from the Bank was being 
canvassed for a dry canal project aimed at providing a rail 
alternative to the use of the Panama Canal. The Bank 
lawyers did not attend despite the project's constitutional 
and legal implications for Nicaragua and their 
repercussions on the social and political stability of the 
country. Little attention was paid to the fact that 
Nicaragua was being asked to (i) yield, in effect, 
sovereignty to foreign investors over a large swathe of land 
across the country with the risk of the break up of the 
country into two political units, (ii) overrun the rights of 
indigenous peoples' rights as well as others and (iii) ignore 
the benefits to the Nicaraguan economy of alternative 
integrated development strategies. The sole guaranteed 
benefit to Nicaragua is to be a relatively modest annual 
land rent. I felt that the presence of officials from the US 
Departments of State and Commerce and Industry at the 
presentation was ominous. I hope that Nicaragua is not so 
dumb as to agree to the project in its current form.
THE CASE FOR PRIVATIZATION
Much has been written and said by academicians and 
practitioners alike and by private and public organizations 
including development institutions such as the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank and almost all now 
agree that privatization is a necessary strategy for the 
developing countries to adopt to improve economic- 
performance and for many countries it is the only route to 
take to regain solvency. But there is no doubt that in many 
countries privatization has not been the success it had 
been touted to be, the poor have become poorer and been 
deprived of convenient access to basic housing, health and 
educational needs and that a privileged minority has 
grossly benefitted directly from the implementation of 
government programs to dispose of state owned assets.
Nonetheless, there are severe practicable problems 
inherent in a government continuing to own and operate 
commercial enterprises. The pressures are not there for 
the state enterprise to be a viable commercial entity. 
Managers are usually political appointees who can become 
complacent and inefficient in the knowledge that they 
cannot be forced out. Governments often ignore the 
bottom line and intervene to further political objectives 
such as diverting funds to the party in power, buying off 
trade unions, for example, by preventing lay offs of 
redundant labor and staff, granting enhanced wage 
settlements and giving employment to party supporters at 
election time. Governments are also not averse to 
controlling prices to contain inflation or maintaining 
uneconomic services to political constituencies.
Governments are also unwilling to submit state owned 
enterprises to the rigors of an open competitive market 
and arrogate to themselves monopoly rights in the sectors 
in which they are active. In other words, their survival is
not dependent upon pleasing the customer and the 
incentives are insufficient for even public-private joint 
ventures in such circumstances to improve financial 
efficiencies. The managers of state owned enterprises and 
public-private joint ventures expect the government to 
break their fall wrhen it happens. The upshot is that total 
or partial state ownership tend to discourage competition 
in the market and encourage government pursuit of 
policies to underpin particular interests mainly those that 
will enable unpopular governments to continue in power.
On the other hand, the benefits to local economies of 
privatization arise only when private undertakings operate 
within a legal framework that (i) enables them to enter 
and exit the market easily in an orderly legally defined 
manner, (ii) compels them to make public disclosures of 
key company matters especially in sectors that concern 
local strategic and vital economic interests and (iii) 
subjects them to an open competitive market by requiring 
essentially that they do not engage in conduct and 
concerted practices that impede or distort competition 
and that they do not abuse a dominant position in the 
market.
The theoretical justification of privatization is that the 
private sector is in a better position than* the government 
to manage tasks of a commercial nature because of the 
flexible institutional and legal rules that govern private 
undertakings and that, in an open competitive market, 
privatization of public enterprises results in industrial 
efficiency and the most efficient and optimal allocation 
and use of local human, natural and other economic 
resources. Privatization also attracts private capital, local 
and foreign, into sectors traditionally operated by the state 
such as transport infrastructure, telecommunications, 
utilities, health and education.
PRIVATIZATION EXPERIENCE
However, the early efforts in privatization that took 
place in Latin American countries such as Peru, Venezuela, 
Mexico and Argentina in the eighties and later ino o
Indonesia were primarily for practical reasons such as for 
purposes of reducing the public debt and sometimes 
mistakenly to meet current expenditures. The 
conservative government in Britain under Mrs Thatcher 
and the United States were probably driven by economic 
dogma. Russia seized on this and, with USAID-financed 
academicians teaming in the halls of the Kremlin, 
embarked on a wholesale disposal of valuable state assets 
without adequate preparation. Huge profits were made 
almost overnight by the privileged purchasers of the state's 
assets. Those involved ignored law and good practice for 
the sake of implementing policy. Other countries such as 
France which began initiating privatization programs 
under the first Chirac government because it enabled theo
state to focus on its natural mission and functions, namely, 
to promote and defend public interests, security, safety 
and health and education.
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In many developing countries, the large size of the public 
sector is a threat to economic growth because it usually 
meant that scarce resources were being used to prop up 
failing state enterprises. Privatization is commonly 
perceived as a device for ridding the government and 
government agencies of excessive staff and labor. The resultto o
often was to miss out on the other ingredients such as 
programs to redeploy the labor force and the enactment of 
anti-trust legislation and competition rules that are 
absolutely necessary to make privatization an economic and 
political success. Moreover, privatization schemes aided by 
World Bank and other donor and aid agencies can result in 
the creation of new state agencies to channel funds to the 
local private sector, to attract foreign investors, to administer 
the privatization processes and to perform regulatory 
functions. The expansion of the size of the public sector 
continues to remain unabated in the developing countries.
Peru and Venezuela and Indonesia are now in turmoil 
and the World Bank and donor and aid institutions have 
programs to relieve poverty in these and other countries. 
Mexico went through a severe economic and banking crisiso o
in the late nineties and was only saved by massive aid from 
the US and the IMF. Its long term sustainability is still 
unclear. Argentina, despite all its resources and natural 
wealth, is the recent victim of its past policies   it had 
completely privatized its economy at a rapid pace by the 
mid-nineties. It has accumulated over US $ 120 billion in 
foreign debt and is practically broke and is struggling to 
feed its own children. Brazil is beginning to show 
symptoms of another catastrophe.
In Russia, the Yeltsin government was on a privatization 
spree of unprecedented proportion. The vast capital flight 
that followed was inevitable and millions across the 
country are barely surviving because of the absence of both 
public and private investment. The funds generated by 
Russia's privatization measures and, for that matter, 
Argentina's, are largely invested abroad. These and many 
other developing countries now rely on huge amounts of 
funding from the World Bank and IMF whose funds have 
been consistently used as a vehicle to move capital abroad.
Many developing countries have embarked on ambitious 
plans to privatize public undertakings, some for very sound 
economic reasons and some, unfortunately, for dubious 
purposes. The privatization objective of generating export 
earnings is questionable if the earnings are not managed 
and accounted for properly. They are far more likely to be 
invested or otherwise expended abroad. To get rid of 
excess staff and labor by passing on the responsibility to a 
private purchaser of state assets does not still relieve the 
government of the social and political problem of having to 
deploy the staff and labor affected elsewhere. In a corrupt 
public environment, the sale or other disposition of state 
assets such as awards of concessions and leases can also 
yield generous fees and commissions for friends and 
relatives of government leaders and lead to capital flight.
BACK TO THE FUTURE
One would think that in both developing and developed, 
the state had always owned many of the undertakings they 
own now but actually it was not so. Immediately after the 
second world war, countries in Europe began 
systematically to nationalize private enterprises operating 
in key sectors of their economies   steel, coal, oil 
refineries, ports, energy, railways, civil aviation. Holding 
companies were created by the state to own stock in other 
private companies across the board. As recently as 1981, 
France under Mitterand began an extensive program of 
nationalization. In countries such as Britain, France and 
Italy, the state was involved widely in many productive 
sectors of the economy. The involvement in business 
enterprises of the Italian state and government and 
political parties is so pervasive that every one in Italy in a 
significant entrepreneurial activity is touched by the state. 
The socialist governments during the aftermath of the 
second world war and even much longer held to a theory 
that the state must own public services and production 
and resources of public interest.
We have to note that these same countries, Britain, 
France and Italy are very prosperous countries today 
despite the fact that much of their economic growth 
occurred before their commitment to privatization as a 
major objective of their economic policies. What it means 
is that there are other factors such as ill managed 
government institutions and an unreliable legal order 
which can retard economic growth in developing countries 
besides the mere fact of state ownership of economic and 
commercial enterprises and that it may be short sighted to 
think that privatization is a kind of panacea for the 
economic evils persistent in the developing countries. 
Fortunately, the developed countries during their process 
of evolution and economic growth were not faced with the 
external economic and financial and diplomatic pressures 
that the governments of developing countries face today.
The developing countries when they got their 
independence evidently copied their colonial masters and 
with advice from these countries a whole slate of state 
enterprises was created. In a sense, therefore, the current 
programs to privatize the very same industries that were in 
private hands before nationalization are indeed a case of 
going back in time to the future. That is not to say that 
privatization is bad economic policy but it does mean that, 
in any event, privatization or not, strong relatively 
incorruptible government institutions and efficient and 
reliable legal, law enforcement and judicial systems are 
absolutely necessary and, as can be seen from the 
experience of Peru, Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia 
and Mexico, more so for the successful implementation of 
privatization programs. The governments can then focus 
on their natural mission and purpose, namely, to defend 
the interests, safety and health and education of their 
peoples. 11
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France, for example, was driven to divesting the
' I ' o
government from the control of and involvement in 
hundreds of business enterprises not for reasons of 
economic efficiency or dogma like Britain and the United 
States, because the French state enterprises still are some 
of the best run and efficient undertakings in Europe, but 
rather by France's concern that governments should not 
be distracted from their natural mission and purpose. It is 
conceivable that the generally better health, education and 
living standards in France are due to the priority given by 
the government to such concerns - to govern in the public 
interest rather than to promote privatization for 
privatization sake.
PRIVATIZATION STRATEGIES
Privatization, in its purest sense, involves the transfer of 
the assets and interests of a state entity or state owned 
undertaking to private ownership with the responsibility 
for control, management and financing shouldered1 o o
absolutely by the new private owner who can dispose of 
the acquired assets and interests in any way the law 
permits. This strategy would apply especially to disposals 
of purely commercial enterprises involving manufacturing 
and sales of goods and services of no public interest. In 
fact, the private owner may even shut down the activity if 
the private owner wishes to do so like all failing private 
undertakings. At the other extreme is the commono
practice of government departments to give out on 
contract to private contractors the execution of various 
tasks or projects e.g. construction of roads and offices, 
supply of goods and provision of discrete services. There 
is nothing novel in this as many private companies too out 
source many of their in-house tasks to sub-contractors. It 
is generally agreed that the outsourcing of government 
work by contracting with outside private suppliers of 
goods and services including civil works contractors is not 
privatization and is perfectly legal.
There is generally no prohibition against outsourcing by 
government departments and statutory authorities but 
under certain circumstances they can be illegal particularly 
if a statutory function is judicial or quasi judicial. Broadly 
speaking, in a respected democratic society every duty of 
a government servant has to be discharged in a fair and 
just manner and that means in a judicial manner. For 
example, is a government tender board award of a 
contract to a private contractor for the construction of a 
road or port terminal on the recommendation of an 
outside World Bank-financed consultant a lawful exercise 
of the tender board's role as the authority to decide on 
such awards. Indeed, in my World Bank experience, the 
defense of many government departments when there is 
controversy over an award is to say that they acted on the 
advice of a foreign consultant thus acknowledging their 
unlawful relinquishment of a statutory duty. The extreme 
case would be where a judge takes a decision on a case 
before him or her, influenced by the advice of a USAID or
World Bank-financed consultant lawyer engaged in a lawJ o o
and judicial reform project.
In between, there are various privatization strategies 
depending on the type of assets   utilities, mining, 
transport, hospitals, schools, oil, research, banking and 
insurance - the competitiveness of the industry or sector, 
the public interest at stake and the size of the capital 
markets at home and abroad. Various techniques are 
employed but, in general, the governments maintain some 
sort of link with the private enterprise taking over the state 
assets either directly by participating in the organization, 
stock holding and direction of the privatized enterprise or 
indirectly through regulatory mechanisms. These links
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between the government and the privatized enterprise are 
particularly strong in the developed countries which 
provide in their privatization schemes for measures against 
any attempt by a foreign investor to take control of the 
privatized industry, sector or enterprise and measures 
against predatory trade, business and company practices.
KEY TO SUCCESSFUL PRIVATIZATION
In any event, the privatized state enterprises in the 
developed countries such as Britain, France and Italy 
operate within the local legal, economic, monetary and 
banking and tax systems and are thus fully integrated into 
the local economies. There are no bilateral agreements 
with the countries of origin of the foreign investors other 
than for free trade, no sovereign guarantees, no freezing of 
the law governing the transactions, no assurances ofo o '
compensation for damages caused by Acts of God and 
foreign events except in the public interest under the 
general law, no authorizations of payments and receipts 
other than through the local banking svstem and the
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central banks, no privileged position in the market, no 
obligations to stabilize local taxes and no exemption from 
current local taxes and duties other than incentives 
provided under the law generally to special sectors and 
industries.
In other words, for privatization to achieve the widely 
accepted economic development objectives, namely, 
accrual of the benefits to the whole economy, securing the 
best price for the sale or other disposition of the state 
enterprise, assuring enterprise efficiency and 
performance, accessing capital and know-how, and 
expanding local capital markets, (i) a strong anti-trust and 
competition law to govern the market and associated 
institutions should be in place and (ii) all transactions 
should be made within the local legal, economic, 
monetary and banking and tax systems.
Before proceeding with the privatization exercise it 
would be necessary to prepare the state enterprise for the 
proposed mode of divestment to the private sector. This 
would necessarily involve (i) the determination of the 
constitutionality of privatization in any particular case, (ii) 
the construction of a legal framework that provides for the
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validity in law of the various steps to be undertaken, and 
(iii) the establishment of a regulatory body where 
appropriate.
The preliminary question always is whether an action to 
be taken by the government to involve the private sector 
particularly in the provision of public services and services 
rendered by statutory authorities such as a Ports Authority 
is a divestment of state assets falling within the definition of 
privatization prohibited under the constitution and the 
governing statute. For example, under authority given in 
the preamble to the French Constitution of 1946 requiring 
the state to take over all private undertakings that were 
connected with the provision of a public service, hundreds 
of private undertakings were nationalized. The 1958 
Constitution provided for the French legislature to pass 
laws, inter alia, to do the reverse, namely, the divestiture of 
public property to the private sector. Britain, by contrast, 
had no constitutional impediments because it has no 
defined constitution but was nonetheless constrained to 
privatize state enterprises only under legislation enacted by 
Parliament as in France. In fact, the introduction of private 
management by contract of the Royal Dockyards had to be 
carried out under a special Act of Parliament.
The question that pops up in many developing 
countries is whether private investment in and 
management of assets of statutory authorities engaged in 
providing public services such as ports and airports and 
toll roads and power plants under so-called BOT (Build- 
Operate-Transfer) projects are legal without special 
legislation. Is a concession granted without the approval of 
parliament to a private undertaking for investment in a 
port terminal dr expressway and its absolute control and 
operation for periods of thirty years or longer until the 
investment is recovered an illegal transfer of statutory 
functions to a private undertaking? What it means is that 
both the government and the concessionaire have to 
assure themselves that the transfer of state assets and 
responsibilities for public services to the private sector is 
valid under the constitution and the law of the country 
concerned.
One way to avoid controversy over the legality of 
privatization of any particular state enterprise in any 
particular manner is to enact a general law to authorize the 
divestiture of state assets setting out the definition and 
scope of privatization and the procedures to be adopted to 
privatize state enterprises. For example, the Turkish Law 
on Privatization permitted the government not only to 
decide which state enterprises to privatize but also to 
decide on the percentage of assets and equity to be sold, 
leased or granted operating rights. Distinctions are made 
between state enterprises engaged in manufacturing, trade 
and commerce in goods and services of no special 
character and those enterprises that deal in goods and 
services that are perceived as basic to the needs of the 
people or have strategic value or have characteristics of a
natural monopoly   energy, water, transport, aviation, 
ports. In France, a single piece of legislation in 1986 
empowered the government to privatize state enterprises 
while in Britain a specific piece of legislation was 
introduced for sale or other disposition of each state 
enterprise.
PRIVATIZATION TECHNIQUES
The techniques that are commonly employed in the 
privatization of state assets include the public offer of shares 
in a joint stock company, private sale of shares or sale of an 
entire state enterprise, management and employee buyouts, 
grant of concessions, public-private joint ventures or a 
combination of these. Losing undertakings could just be 
folded up and their assets sold to the highest bidder. The 
government could simply sell the undertaking to the highest 
bidder as is or after some revamping, restructuring or sub- 
division, form a joint stock company and sell the shares to 
the public and core investors under different formulae or 
sell stocks and shares held by state holding companies in the 
stock market. Debt could be swopped for equity. Each 
sector and state enterprise has to be examined for its 
particular characteristics to be able to implement a 
privatization scheme with wide public support. In Britain, 
government housing units were sold to their occupants with 
minimum formalities.
Public utilities belong to a group of economic and 
commercial activities that are of public and strategic- 
interests besides possessing elements of a natural 
monopoly to varying degrees depending on the type of 
utility   water, gas, electric power, telecommunications. 
Because of the lack or absence of competition in the 
market in the goods and services those utilities sell, they 
are not subject to the disciplines that lead to industrial 
efficiency. The consequences to the consumer in regard to 
availability, price and quality of goods and services can be 
negative unless there is intervention by the government.
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In some strategic and defense areas such as transport, 
energy, water, the powers of the government to intervene 
can be critical.
Government intervention can either be through powers 
exercised by various government departments as in France 
or through regulatory agencies specially established by 
statute for each industry or sector as in Britain and the 
United States. The drawback in the British and US 
practices is that new agencies are created thus defeating 
one privatization objective, namely, the reduction in the 
size of government and, in Britain, regulatory agencies 
tend to cosy up to the principal players in the privatized 
sector or industry   old school tie, royal honors and so on. 
The civil law systems such as in France and Italy can be 
relied upon more to place public interest over everything 
else with the result that there is much more sensitivity to 
worker rights, the gaps between the rich and the poor are 
far more contained and society has a less divisive character. 
Ol course, this can change.
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The Regulator is a unique institution in that it 
performs a variety of conflicting tasks that would be 
regarded as repugnant by a purist believer in democratic 
rights and freedoms. The overall role of the Regulator is 
to monitor, direct and control or govern the conduct of 
companies and other undertakings engaged in the market 
in a particular industry or sector in accordance with a 
privatization statute or law or rule in the context of the 
fundamental values of a whole legal and economic ando
social system. The Regulator is an executive first and 
foremost in its capacity of issuing licenses and permits 
and supervising the functioning of the market but usually 
has powers to enact rules and regulations for the detailed 
operation of the industry or sector concerned, interpret 
the law and adjudicate disputes between companies and 
other undertakings and their customers. He can 
successively be an executive, legislator and judge. In a 
sense, therefore, there is a rationale and indeed legitimacy 
in subjecting the privatized industry or sector to the 
supervision of all the departments of government but in 
certain sectors the sharing of regulatory functions among 
several government departments can be unwieldy and 
cumbersome.
CONCLUSION
Since a government consists of three branches, namely,
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executive, legislative and judiciary, any privatization 
scheme that is adopted by the executive on behalf of the 
government involving the disposal or disposition of land, 
natural and other key economic resources should have the 
approval of the legislative body and be sustainable in the 
local courts of law.
Because of severe distortions in the local markets due to 
the absence of a competitive law framework and 
irregularities in the divestment procedures and because of 
continued invasive links between the private sector and the 
governments, privatization in developing countries has 
resulted in increased prices, increased levels of 
unemployment and neglect of services particularly to 
politically weak and vulnerable segments of the population. 
Nonetheless, it is safe to say that purely commercial 
enterprises should be left to the private sector to own, 
control and manage.o
However, in regard to strategic areas such as defense, 
home security, energy, water supplies, transport 
infrastructure, ports and airports, communications and
sectors such as education and health and social services, it 
would be risky, if not dangerous, to leave ownership and 
control in the hands of the private sector especially foreign 
based private enterprises and foreign state agencies. In 
those areas, it would be prudent to involve the private 
sector only under contractual arrangements under 
conditions that do not transfer absolute control to the 
private enterprises.
Countries such as France and Italy have shown that 
states can manage enterprises even of a commercial nature 
as well as the private sector and some major companies in 
the private sector have demonstrated how corruptible they 
can be. Economic dogma aside, the powerful rationale for 
privatization is the view, which I believe is shared by 
France, that the government should privatize public assets 
to enable it to focus on its natural purpose and mission, 
namely, to protect and defend the vital interests, security, 
safety, health and education of its people.
The proof of a successful privatization exercise is not so 
much the improvement in performance per se (increased 
output and sales and lower labour and other costs and 
higher profits) of the privatized activity as the direct and 
indirect long term benefits to the local economy. It iso J
conceivable that the current spate of disposal of natural 
and other key economic resources of developing countries 
to foreign companies sets the stage for (i) civil strife as 
different segments of the society vie for a share in the 
profits of the sale and use of the public assets and (ii) 
ultimate intervention by the developed countries to 
protect their people and their proprietary and trading 
interests and their benefactors in government. The ghosts 
of the East India Company seem to be everywhere. I am 
afraid that the World Bank and the IMF are unwitting 
partners in this development.
Dr K V S K Nathan
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